attractiveness and competitiveness within COMESA Region, as a destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and in which domestic investments are encouraged." 4 Among the key pillars of the Agreement is the, "settlement of investment disputes through negotiations and arbitration mechanism." 5 It is the purpose of this paper to examine the new CCIA Agreement and the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism that this treaty has put in place. It will do so not only through an examination of procedural structures, but also by considering the interaction between these and the substantive claims that can be brought by an investor under the Agreement.
The paper will do so in three stages. First, so as to set the scene, the wider contemporary debate on the problems of investor-state dispute settlement, and their proposed solutions, will be examined so as to explain the background against which the dispute settlement provisions of the CCIA Agreement were finalised. It is clear from the face of these provisions that they seek to offer a new approach to investor-state dispute settlement which takes into account the types of problems that will be outlined below. Indeed it is fair to say that the CCIA Agreement is a significant new model for these purposes, in that it proposes an approach that is sensitive to the realities of developing states and of the particular conditions that influence approaches to international commercial arbitration in Africa. Given that the On the part of investors, the foremost concern is whether dispute settlement provisions in IIAs are truly effective in protecting their rights and interests.
While claims can be brought awards are often far lower than the sum claimed. For example in the case of TECMED v Mexico, in its award rendered in May 2003, the tribunal found the governmental measure at issue to violate the full protection and security standard and to be expropriatory.
The compensation ($5.5 million) awarded was far below the amount claimed which was $52 million. 10 Equally in the recent awards against Argentina under the US-Argentina BIT of 1991 the tribunals that found against Argentina nonetheless held that their award of damages would take account of the reality of the economic crisis that Argentina was facing.
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Thus investor's claims will be considered in the full context of the surrounding circumstances. As one tribunal has put it, BITs "are not insurance policies against bad business judgments".
12
On the part of host countries, concerns have been expressed, first, as to the risk of large awards being made against them. For example in the case of CME v Czech Republic, an award of some $350 million was made. This raised serious concerns about the legitimacy of such large awards. However, given the fact that most awards fall significantly below the amount claimed this award may be somewhat out of line with mainstream practice. 13 On the other hand, should the Argentine cases go against the host country it has been estimated that Argentina would face a compensation bill of some $80 billion. uvic.ca/documents/SempraAward.pdf the tribunal stated: "The Tribunal does not believe that the issue here is one of lowering the standards of protection set under the Treaty or the law. This being said, however, the manner in which the law has to be applied cannot ignore the realities resulting from a crisis situation, including how a crisis affects the normal functioning of any given society. This is the measure of justice that the Tribunal is bound to respect. The Tribunal will accordingly take into account the crisis conditions affecting Argentina when determining the compensation due for the liability found in connection with the breach of the Treaty standards Award." (at para. 397 It is hard to see how such a sum could ever be paid by a host country. The social implications of such a pay out could be disastrous and would lead to complex negotiations about debt financing and reconstruction, as no other routes would exist for such sums to be found.
A second concern for host states is that international arbitral tribunals lack the legitimacy of a court of law and so they ought not to have the responsibility to pronounce upon the legality or otherwise of governmental action. Indeed their power to do so may result in an illegitimate interference with the host country's right to regulate and could lead to "regulatory chill" in that host country authorities would make decisions not based so much on the wider public interest but with a view to avoiding liability to investors under an applicable IIA. 15 In some cases this could lead to decisions that favour investor rights over other equally important, if not superior, claims upon the regulatory obligations of public authorities.
A third major concern for host countries is the risk that particular cases will give rise to multiple claims from the same multinational corporate group, causing overstretch in resources and time devoted to defending such claims.
This occurred in the CME litigation against the Czech Republic, where both the Netherlands based holding company of the entity undertaking the investment in the Czech Republic and the owner of the parent company both brought separate proceedings in separate venues arising out of the same facts. 16 Corporate groups will not be seen as a single entity for these purposes. Given the context of the present paper some further concerns relating to the use of investor-state arbitration in Africa must be highlighted. whether it is an independent cause of action that raises no such issue. CCIA Committee may establish and make available to the public a standard form for applying for status as amicus curiae. This may include specific criteria which will help guide a tribunal in determining whether to accept a submission in any given instance." Therefore more detailed guidance on how this discretion is to be used must await the formulation of such guidelines, which is not mandatory given the non-binding language used in this paragraph. 57 an arbitral tribunal, or the pleadings, evidence and decisions in them, shall be available to the public."
The submissions shall be provided in English, French or Portuguese or in the principal language of the host state. To ensure the identity and affiliation of the submitter the submission, "shall identify the submitter and any Party, other government, person, or organization, other than the submitter, that has provided, or will provide, any financial or other 54 Ibid Article 28 (8). 55 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Annex A Article 8. By para.3, "The CCIA Committee may establish and make available to the public a standard form for applying for status as amicus curiae. This may include specific criteria which will help guide a tribunal in determining whether to accept a submission in any given instance." 56 CCIA Agreement ibid Annex A Article 8. 57 Some guidance as to what could be included in such guidelines can be obtained from Article 39(4) of the Canadian Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement: "In determining whether to grant leave to file a non-disputing party submission, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to which: (a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the arbitration by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties; (b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; (c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the arbitration; and (d) there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration. for poor administrative practices. This is not an approach that will find favour with investors, but it is an understandable attempt to curtail unreasonable claims.
Indeed there is some arbitral case-law which suggests that the specific conditions in the host country are a factor that tribunals can taken into account when assessing whether a BIT has been infringed. Thus, the tribunal, in the CMS Case held that account should be taken of the effect of abnormal conditions, prompted by the economic crisis in Argentina, in 86 The Note of interpretation was considered to be mandatory by the One notable issue arising here is whether the legitimacy of the measure in question will be considered in the light of its proportionality to the regulatory aim being pursued. Such an 95 Ibid Article 20 (7). 96 See further Muchlinski above n.39 at 587-96. 97 See for example the US-Rwanda BIT above n.59 Article 6 and Annexes A and B. In Annex B para.4 (b): "Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations." See too Canadian FIPA above n.57 Article 13 and Annex B(13) (1) (c): "Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation." This approach follows the structure of Article XX of the GATT and introduces a "chapeau" outlining a test of the legitimacy of a measure in relation to the aims of the Agreement. It applies an analogy with the GATT Agreement, which refers to arbitrary and unjustifiable 99 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Article 22(1). Article 22 goes on to say that, "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member State of measures: (a) designed and applied to protect national security and public morals; (b) designed and applied to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (c) designed and applied to protect the environment; or (d) any other measures as may from time to time be determined by a Member State, subject to approval by the CCIA Committee. 2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Member State from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to the principles outlined in sub-paragraphs 1(a) to (c) above. 3. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to: (a) preclude a Member State from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations under the United Nations Charter with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests; or (b) require a Member State to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential security interests. giving to it more flexibility in carrying out legitimate regulatory action.
Where the CCIA Agreement goes further, though, is in the introduction of the concept of investor obligations as a balance against host country obligations. This is still a very tentative development and it is rather limited compared to certain NGO initiatives in this field. 
